Peercoin was the very first Bitcoin-based monetary system to utilize proof-of-stake as a mechanism to ensure its own integrity. However, there are some objections to Peercoin's proof-of-stake model. This information presents those objections along with a similar system redesigned to handle them.Block
Chain Software
In a simplified version of Peercoin's proof-of-stake design, each node can use section of its balance as a stake allowing it to chain blocks. The bigger that stake, the more chances this node has of increasing the block chain. The reward for chaining blocks is 1% of the used stake as newly minted coins, annually. Conversely, making transactions requires paying a fee that destroys 0.01 coins per transaction. For instance, after having chained a block using one coin of stake, Bob makes one transaction. Then, the fee of 0.01 coins he pays for making this transaction destroys the 0.01 coins he minted in reward for chaining that block.
Listed below are five objections to this proof-of-stake model:
It amplifies wealth inequality. Suppose Peercoin is the only real form of money for both Bob and Alice. Bob's income is 200 coins monthly, while his expenses are 80% of his income. Alice's income is 800 coins monthly, while her expenses are 50% of her income. Assuming, for simplicity, that neither Bob nor Alice has any savings -- which Alice is prone to have -- Bob and Alice will have a way to reserve 40 and 400 coins as block-chaining stake, respectively. Then, Alice's block-chaining reward is likely to be 900% greater than Bob's, even though her income is only 300% greater than his.blockchainsoftware
It creates the cash supply unstable. Inflation becomes directly proportional to successful block-chaining rewards, yet inversely proportional to paid transaction fees. This variable inflation adds an unnecessary supply of price instability to the rather inevitable ones -- exchange value of merchandise and velocity of money circulation -- thus unnecessarily reducing price transparency and predictability. Peercoin should have a well balanced money supply, as Bitcoin can have after year 2140. Whenever total paid transaction fees are less than total successful block-chaining rewards, all inactive or unsuccessful block-chaining nodes will pay a fee to any or all successful ones through inflation. This implicit value transfer disguises the price of participating in the system.
As coins upsurge in value, the (now 0.01 coins) transaction fee could eventually become too valuable, thus requiring Peercoin developers to lower it. However, choosing its new nominal value is an economic decision -- rather than a technological one -- which creates a political problem. System integrity depends upon extrinsic incentives: both the block-chaining reward and its offsetting transaction fee need arbitrary adjustment, which again involves an economic decision, thus creating a political problem.
Transaction Rights In place of Money
Every one of these five objections have one common origin: the extrinsic, pecuniary nature of block-chaining incentives -- the block-chaining reward less its offsetting transaction fee. Hence, only an intrinsically nonmonetary block-chaining system can address all of them. However, is that system possible?
Yes, if rather than newly minted coins -- or even old ones -- the reward for chaining blocks is the right to make transactions. Then, that reward no further must be directly proportional to stake. For instance, merely having twice the total amount of money owned by Bob is not enough reason for Alice to make twice the volume of transactions created by him. Still, just how to estimate the transaction volume needed by way of a block-chaining stake owner? Can there be any objective indication of the volume?
Yes, despite only a generic one: the actual transaction volume in the system. Then, the reward for chaining a block will no longer be described as a monetary value, but alternatively the combined size of transactions because block as future transaction rights. However, this reward must exceed its own size for future transaction volume to cultivate if necessary. For instance, rather than newly minting 1% of its used stake annually, a block-chaining reward -- in Peercoin, a stake output -- could allow its winner to produce a future level of transactions 1% greater than the combined size of transactions in its containing block.
In a simplified version of Peercoin's proof-of-stake design, each node can use section of its balance as a stake allowing it to chain blocks. The bigger that stake, the more chances this node has of increasing the block chain. The reward for chaining blocks is 1% of the used stake as newly minted coins, annually. Conversely, making transactions requires paying a fee that destroys 0.01 coins per transaction. For instance, after having chained a block using one coin of stake, Bob makes one transaction. Then, the fee of 0.01 coins he pays for making this transaction destroys the 0.01 coins he minted in reward for chaining that block.
Listed below are five objections to this proof-of-stake model:
It amplifies wealth inequality. Suppose Peercoin is the only real form of money for both Bob and Alice. Bob's income is 200 coins monthly, while his expenses are 80% of his income. Alice's income is 800 coins monthly, while her expenses are 50% of her income. Assuming, for simplicity, that neither Bob nor Alice has any savings -- which Alice is prone to have -- Bob and Alice will have a way to reserve 40 and 400 coins as block-chaining stake, respectively. Then, Alice's block-chaining reward is likely to be 900% greater than Bob's, even though her income is only 300% greater than his.blockchainsoftware
It creates the cash supply unstable. Inflation becomes directly proportional to successful block-chaining rewards, yet inversely proportional to paid transaction fees. This variable inflation adds an unnecessary supply of price instability to the rather inevitable ones -- exchange value of merchandise and velocity of money circulation -- thus unnecessarily reducing price transparency and predictability. Peercoin should have a well balanced money supply, as Bitcoin can have after year 2140. Whenever total paid transaction fees are less than total successful block-chaining rewards, all inactive or unsuccessful block-chaining nodes will pay a fee to any or all successful ones through inflation. This implicit value transfer disguises the price of participating in the system.
As coins upsurge in value, the (now 0.01 coins) transaction fee could eventually become too valuable, thus requiring Peercoin developers to lower it. However, choosing its new nominal value is an economic decision -- rather than a technological one -- which creates a political problem. System integrity depends upon extrinsic incentives: both the block-chaining reward and its offsetting transaction fee need arbitrary adjustment, which again involves an economic decision, thus creating a political problem.
Transaction Rights In place of Money
Every one of these five objections have one common origin: the extrinsic, pecuniary nature of block-chaining incentives -- the block-chaining reward less its offsetting transaction fee. Hence, only an intrinsically nonmonetary block-chaining system can address all of them. However, is that system possible?
Yes, if rather than newly minted coins -- or even old ones -- the reward for chaining blocks is the right to make transactions. Then, that reward no further must be directly proportional to stake. For instance, merely having twice the total amount of money owned by Bob is not enough reason for Alice to make twice the volume of transactions created by him. Still, just how to estimate the transaction volume needed by way of a block-chaining stake owner? Can there be any objective indication of the volume?
Yes, despite only a generic one: the actual transaction volume in the system. Then, the reward for chaining a block will no longer be described as a monetary value, but alternatively the combined size of transactions because block as future transaction rights. However, this reward must exceed its own size for future transaction volume to cultivate if necessary. For instance, rather than newly minting 1% of its used stake annually, a block-chaining reward -- in Peercoin, a stake output -- could allow its winner to produce a future level of transactions 1% greater than the combined size of transactions in its containing block.
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